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ARGUMENT
In his opposition brief, Olsen asserts that Eagle Mountain's proposed
interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions is contrary to the express language of
the statutes, and further, would produce an absurd result in that an employee would be
required to make a request for something to which he or she is not yet entitled.
Nevertheless, the legislature specifically mandated that the procedure in Section 902
apply to "requests for reimbursement" following acquittal of criminal charges. Olsen's
interpretation would render the relevant portion of the reimbursement statute, Utah Code
Ann. § 52-6-202, virtually meaningless.
Olsen claims that the legislature's reference to the Section 902 procedure means
only that an employee must "submit a written request," and therefore, none of the
provisions related to the timing of the written request, or indeed, any of the other Section
902 requirements, are applicable. Olsen's argument is premised on three assertions: (1)
the term "claim" is defined in the GIAU as a "demand or cause of action for money or
damages," and therefore, the timing provisions are only applicable to civil cases, (2)
requesting a defense from the governmental entity in advance would require a criminal
defendant to waive his constitutionally protected right to counsel of his choice, and (3)
the term "manner" in the reimbursement statute is meant to refer only to the means of
asserting a claim and not to the time for asserting a claim. None of these assertions has
merit.
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First, while Olsen is correct in that the term "claim" is specifically defined in the
GIAU, Section 902 also uses the word "action" interchangeably, e.g. "a governmental
entity shall defend any action . . . . " Section 902(1). Given that the legislature intended
for Section 902 to apply in situations involving payment of attorney fees in criminal
cases, an exception for the timing provisions in criminal cases asserted against employees
would have the result of eviscerating the purpose of the Section 902 procedure. Further,
examination of the definition of the term "claim" does not explain the legislature's
specific reference to Section 902 in the criminal reimbursement statute.
Next, Olsen's assertion that Eagle Mountain's proposed interpretation would
require a criminal defendant to somehow waive his constitutional right to counsel of his
choice is equally unavailing. Nothing in the statute requires the government employee to
acquiesce to any selection of counsel by a governmental entity. Of course, the employee
may hire and pay his own counsel at any time, without restriction. The only restrictions
may arise when the government employee seeks to be reimbursed for attorneys' fees.
The employee has no constitutional right to the benefit of payment for any attorney of the
employee's choosing, or to multiple, successive attorneys, at any cost. However, the
failure to request a defense at the inception of the case results in severe prejudice to the
governmental entity.1

1

Olsen's request for reimbursement of $ 119,834.90 consists of $3,629.13 to the law
firm of Stirba & Associates, $34,705.74 to the law firm of Brown & Moffat, $75,000 in
legal fees to Ron Yengich, who ultimately appeared at trial, $4,992.69 to a private
investigator, $507.54 for a DVD of news clips, and $1000 for a transcript of the
preliminary hearing. (Record at 42). Because Olsen failed to timely request a defense,
{00090395.DOC /}
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Olsen also attempts to draw an artificial distinction based on the use of the word
"manner" in the reimbursement statute. Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-202 states: "[a] request
for reimbursement of attorney fees and court costs shall be filed in the manner provided
in Sections 63G-7-902 and 63G-7-903" (emphasis added). According to Olsen, the word
"manner" indicates only the particular means of asserting a claim. Therefore, compliance
with the statute requires only that a reimbursement request be submitted under the means
specified in Section 902, e.g. "in writing," to the governmental entity. In Olsen's view,
all of the remaining provisions of Section 902 are inapplicable, including the "time"
requirements that would result in a bar to Olsen's claim.
While creative, Olsen's apportionment of the word "manner" in the
reimbursement statute makes little sense. Olsen seeks to distill the lengthy procedural
requirements of Section 902 down to a simple "written request," however, such
oversimplification would completely nullify all but a few words of Section 902. Even the
sentence in Section 902 which mentions "written request" is in the context of requesting a
defense. Despite Olsen's assertions, the statute in question is not silent as to when a
request for reimbursement should be made. The timing requirements are set forth in
Section 902.
This Court previously noted that the term "manner" is defined as "the mode or
method in which something is done or happens: a mode of procedure or way of action."
Eagle Mountain was prejudiced by Olsen's selection of multiple, successive counsel,
duplication of effort, and an apparent result fee charged by Mr. Yengich.
2

"[T]he governmental employee shall make a written request to the governmental
entity to defend the employee." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902(2)(a).
{00090395.DOC /}
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Hulbert v. State, 607 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 1980) (citing Webster's Third International
Dictionary). Thus, the term "manner" and the reference to detailed procedures and
conditions in Section 902 and Section 903, which specifically include the timing of
submitting a request, should be interpreted as a procedure, and not merely a means.
Olsen's conclusion that he was simply required to "file a written request" is
equally perplexing when evaluated in the context of the reference in the reimbursement
statute to Section 903, which makes no mention of "written request." While Section 902
sets forth the conditions and circumstances wherein the governmental entity may provide
a defense, Section 903 sets forth the conditions whereby the governmental entity may be
liable to the employee after denying the request for a defense. If a defense was requested
and denied, then Section 903 is applicable. Section 903 makes no reference to a "written
request." Obviously, if Olsen's interpretation were accepted, then the legislature's
reference to Section 903 would be meaningless as well. It is well-established that a
statutory provision must be construed so as to make it harmonious with other statutes
relevant to the subject matter. Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah
1980). Olsen's interpretation is completely incongruent.
Another consideration weighing against Olsen's proposed interpretation is the
mandatory nature of the time requirements of Section 902. Our courts have held that
statutory provisions should be considered mandatory, as contrasted with directory, when
the legislature has attached consequences to the failure to act. Stahl, 618 P.2d at 481;
Pearson v. Lamb, 2005 UT App. 383. Here, Section 902 sets forth a clear penalty for the
{00090395.DOC /}
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failure to timely submit a request in that the governmental entity is relieved from
defending the employee. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902(2)(b). As a result, all of the
provisions of Section 902, including the timing provisions, are part and parcel of a
unified, mandatory procedure governing requests for reimbursement. Section 902 cannot
be apportioned as Olsen suggests.
Olsen's interpretation is also contradicted by the history of amendments to the
reimbursement statute. If, as Olsen asserts, the language used by the legislature in Utah
Code Ann. § 52-6-202, e.g. "in the manner provided in Sections 63G-7-902 and 63G-7903," simply means "filing a written request for reimbursement," then the legislature
simply could have stated so. Of course, with little effort, the legislature could have left
the reimbursement statute unchanged, since it previously amended the statute to refer to
the "notice of claim" procedure set forth in the GIAU. See Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-202
(1983). If the reimbursement statute referred to the "notice of claim" procedure instead
of "Section 902 and 903," then Olsen's proposed interpretation would perhaps make
sense. The "notice of claim" procedure set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401(2)
provides:
Any person having a claim against a governmental entity, or against its employee
for an act or omission occurring during the performance of the employee's duties,
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall file a written
notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, regardless of whether
or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental,
(emphasis added).
Under this provision, a simple written request would suffice.

{00090395 DOC/}
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Olsen has not, nor could he, offer any explanation for why the legislature amended
the reimbursement statute to refer to the detailed and specific procedures of Section 7902 and Section 7-903, instead of the former language referring to the "notice of claim"
provision of the GIAU. Olsen merely argues that the procedures in Section 902 should
be inapplicable to criminal cases. However, "[i]t is the prerogative of the legislature to
make such conditions precedent to the maintenance of an action against a city or town as
it sees fit and the courts cannot relieve parties from the obligation of meeting those
conditions." Peterson v. Salt Lake City, 221 P.2d 591, 593 (Utah 1950). Moreover, the
Court is "obliged to presume that a significant change in the words of the statute by the
Legislature was intended to effectuate a change in interpretation." RDG
Associates/Jorman Corp, v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 741 P.2d 948, 951 (Utah 1987)
(citations omitted).
Finally, Olsen asserts that Eagle Mountain's proposed interpretation is so illogical
that no party has previously made such an argument. However, as noted in Appellant's
Opening Brief, in Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996), Davis County
asserted the very same procedural defect as a defense to a claim for attorney's fees
because the employee failed to make a written request for a defense of a criminal charge
until after he was acquitted at trial. The issue was not decided, however, because Davis
County failed to raise the defense until the matter was on appeal and the Court found that
any alleged defect had been waived. Salmon, 916 P.2d at 894, fn. 3. The most logical
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interpretation, consistent with the purpose of the reimbursement statute itself, is the one
submitted by Eagle Mountain.
CONCLUSION
Under well-established principles of statutory construction, Olsen's claim must
fail as a matter of law.
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of March, 2010.
PARSONS KINGHORN HARRIS

A Professional Corporation

By:
Gerald H. ttCinghj;
Catherine ^/Brabson
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
City of Eagle Mountain
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